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A~STRACT 
LIBRARIANSHAVE TAKEN ESSENTIALLY three philosophical positions concern- 
ing the problem of including Holocaust denial literature in library col- 
lections: (1) that such materials must be included to uphold the precepts 
of intellectual freedom, (2) that they should be excluded because they 
are false, and (3) that they should be included but labeled as inaccurate. 
Librarians in different types of libraries face different issues when decid- 
ing whether to collect denial materials. The nature of evidence is such 
that it is difficult for librarians to judge objectively the accuracy of all 
materials, and they should not undertake the role of arbiters of truth. 
Librarians’ responses should be to responsibly and intelligently build col- 
lections that provide access to the views of the deniers and to those who 
refute them. 
“Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all 
points of view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be 
excluded because of the origin, background, or views of those contribut- 
ing to their creation” (American Library Association, Office for Intellec- 
tual Freedom, 1992, p. 3) .  
This is the second tenet for libraries enumerated in the Library Bill of 
Rights, the statement of guidelines on intellectual freedom endorsed by 
the American Library Association (ALA). It calls upon information pro- 
fessionals subscribing to these policies to include in their collections a 
wide variety of materials on a wide variety of issues and implies that librar- 
ians would be wrong to buy materials that presented only one side of the 
debate on a current social issue such as euthanasia. Likewise, librarians 
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who only purchased materials that presented Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
New Deal in a positive light would be guilty of ignoring other historical 
interpretations of this period in American history. 
Now suppose that a new book was published by a historian who 
claimed not that the New Deal was merely misguided or ineffective, but 
that it never really happened. Suppose a new book claimed there was 
never a Social Security system or a Civilian Conservation Corps, and all 
of Roosevelt’s alleged social programs were just fabrications of‘a bunch 
of liberals that were invented to justify the existence of a welfare state. 
Would librarians be free to dismiss such a perspective as inaccurate and 
absurd, or would they be obligated to include the book in their collec- 
tions as an alternative point of view on a historical issue? 
Preposterous as such a scenario may look on the surface, it repre- 
sents a reality. For the past fifteen years, the library profession has actu- 
ally faced a similar situation in the form of a growing body of literature 
that challenges the notion that European Jews were systematically exter- 
minated in German death camps during World War 11. Those who hold 
and promote these views call themselves “historical revisionists” (Shapiro, 
1990, p. 1)and claim that historical accounts of the Holocaust are a myth, 
invented by a conspiracy of Zionists to further the cause of the state of 
Israel (Lipstadt, 1994, p. 9). This has raised complex and troubling ques- 
tions for many librarians about the nature of truth and whether profes- 
sional codes and ethics oblige librarians to provide access to information 
that a mountain of eyewitness and documentary evidence shows is utterly 
false. It has caused some to suggest that limitations on the Library Bill of 
Rights and the concept of intellectual freedom might be necessary to com- 
bat the spread of these hateful and inaccurate views. 
Essentially, librarians have taken three philosophical positions on 
this thorny issue. The first reaffirms the sanctity of intellectual freedom 
and relies on a strict interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights. According 
to this argument, librarians can make no distinctions about what they will 
and will not accept as truthful, for to do so is to cross over the line of 
censorship. The first book they deem untrue, and therefore unworthy of 
inclusion in library collections, sets a precedent for excluding other ma- 
terials and places librarians in the dangerous position of gatekeepers for 
what society can and cannot read or think. The concepts of intellectual 
freedom and free speech, this argument continues, have no value if they 
do not apply equally to all ideas, however bizarre, misguided, or unpopu- 
lar they might be. To include such views in library collections does not 
mean librarians endorse them, but they must not make any value judg- 
ments about providing access to the ideas themselves. 
Swan (1986) argues passionately for this position in defending the role 
of librarians as providers of access to ideas rather than as arbiters of truth: 
It is our job  to provide access not to the truth, but to the fruit of 
human thought and communication; not to reality, but to multiple 
representations thereof. Truth and reality must fend for themselves 
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within each of the complicated creatures who uses the materials we 
have to offer. We can and do learn a great deal from bad ideas and 
untruths. (p. 51) 
The second philosophical position argues that librarians have a pro-
fessional duty not to mislead the people they serve. Proponents of this 
view say librarians should not feel compelled, for example, to include 
materials that advised parents to pour boiling water on their children as a 
remedy for illness or that claimed the Earth was the center of the solar 
system. Books like this would not be selected at all because they are inac- 
curate or even harmful, the argument goes, and no one would think of 
calling such exclusions censorship. Why, then, should the exclusion of 
Holocaust denial literature, which can easily be called both inaccurate 
and harmful, cause librarians to feel any remorse whatsoever? 
Peattie (1986) goes so far as to argue that a qualitative difference 
exists between two false statements like “the Earth is flat” and “the Holo- 
caust is a myth.” Although both are untrue, the first is “morally weight- 
less, while the second is loaded with moral, social, and political implica- 
tions,” he says. “To put them in the same category, as the utterances of 
kooks whom we may tolerate because in the ‘free marketplace of ideas’-
both concepts will (probably) be discarded-is to not think clearly” (p. 
13). Peattie calls the flat-Earth assertion an untruth but the Holocaust 
denial a lie, which he defines as “a deliberate falsehood uttered to deceive 
and hurt people” (p. 14). As far as he is concerned, most libraries should 
have no room in their collections for lies. 
A closely related pro-exclusion position simply states that providing a 
forum for such views is morally wrong and, while the First Amendment pro- 
tects the right of individuals to hold and express these ideas, nothing obli- 
gates libraries “togo out of our way to facilitate their efforts” (Burns, 1986, p. 
79). The crux of this argument is expressed rather eloquently by Bums: 
What is more moral, braver, more in keeping with real democratic 
principles-to let a representative of vile ideas have his or her pub- 
lic say without interruption, or to speak up in accusation and argu- 
ment? Sometimes, in the service of truth and justice, we must do  
what...in other circumstances would be a genuine violation of First 
Amendment precepts ....It is easy not to speak up. It is attractive not 
to make yourself a target for recrimination by the crowd or by the 
object of your protest. All you have to do is keep silent. You can even 
publicly justify your silence, and privately your cowardice, under the 
banner of “Free Speech.” This is the sort of “free speech” that all 
tyrants and would-be tyrants encourage: free speech that gives them 
the right to tell you what they want you to hear, while you exercise 
your right to clench your teeth and take it. (p. 80) 
Peattie (1986) sounds a similar note when he suggests: 
Truth cannot simply endure the presence of a lie. It has to fight it 
and overcome it. The lie behind slavery led to the Civil War; the lie 
behind segregation led to the Civil Rights movement. The Reverend 
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Dr. Martin Luther King, .J . ,  was moved to oppose the lie of racism 
with his truth. (p. 14) 
Those who agree with Burns and Peattie would argue that however 
much any culture tries to promote a pluralistic and neutral society, cer- 
tain common values (some would say truths) bind people together; that 
in fact such commonly held ideals-justice and equality, for example- 
are largely what define the social fabric and are even what makes it pos-
sible for people to coexist at all (Neill, 1988, p. 36). Peattie even points 
out a bothersome paradox inherent in a strict interpretation of the no- 
tion of free speech, a paradox that threatens free speech itself. If a soci- 
ety allows some of its people to believe there should be no free speech (as 
librarians must if they are intellectual freedom purists), that society runs 
the risk of that idea becoming popular and actually destroying the right 
to freedom of speech. Yet, if that same society singles out that one idea 
for exclusion, it destroys freedom of expression while seeking to protect 
it (pp. 16-17). 
The third philosophical position, offered by Pendergrast (1988), ar- 
gues that an appropriate way to deal with false materials or those which 
reflect outdated attitudes is to affix an explanatory note to them which 
warns the reader about their dubious content (p.85). This position would 
allow librarians to retain certain materials in their collections that may 
have some historical value in documenting the existence of false views 
and repugnant attitudes but, at the same time, alert users to the fact that 
these ideas are not widely subscribed to and violate the common values 
of society at large. This position would also be an outright violation of 
the ALA’s Statement on Labeling. Pendergrast admits that advocating such 
a position is in strong conflict with his ethical training as a librarian; he 
rationalizes that “although ‘Thou Shalt Not Steal’ generally applies, there 
are circumstances-starvation, for instance-that certainly justify break- 
ing the rule” (p. 85). 
The pitfalls of the labeling solution are thoughtfully explained by 
Sowards (1988), who writes about the general problem of dealing with 
historical fabrications: 
once begun, [labeling] requires us to conclusively weigh the worth 
of every book in the collection, lest we imply approval of those left 
without warnings. This is not only a gigantic task, but a controversial 
one: it asks librarians to come to unequivocal judgements where 
subject specialists and expert scholars have often been unable to do 
so. Moreover, it begs the question: librarians capable of such evalu- 
ation might more easily solve their problem by weeding, or simply 
forestall the whole issue by omitting to select “objectionable” items 
in the first place. (p. 85) 
The idea of making such judgments about the factual accuracy of 
materials is further decried by Curley and Broderick (1985) in their stan- 
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dard and authoritative text on collection development. If two authors 
disagree with one another over a point of fact, they say, it is surely not up 
to librarians to decide which to believe, nor should they use that decision 
as a selection principle (p. 40). 
Whichever of the three philosophical positions librarians may take 
on the issue of Holocaust denial literature, different kinds of libraries 
must address inclusion or exclusion differently. For academic research 
libraries with exhaustive collections, it is easy to make a case for inclusion 
since scholars must have access to the entire range of academic discourse. 
Indeed, research by Hupp (1991) found that over 19 percent of OCLC-
member academic libraries own at least one Holocaust denial title and 
indicated that academic libraries are the most likely holders of these 
materials (p. 167). 
Although Hupp found no significant difference between the collec- 
tion patterns of research libraries and those of academic libraries at pri- 
marily teaching institutions (p. 171), Pendergrast raises a concern that 
may be more applicable to libraries that predominantly serve undergradu- 
ates. Although he would like to include inaccurate historical materials 
for their value as primary sources, he worries about the possibility that 
some students “may unfortunately be na’ive enough and ill-informed 
enough so that if they find a book in the library, they might automatically 
assume the views expressed in it are accurate” (p. 84). Many librarians 
(and undergraduates) would doubtless take Pendergrast to task for as- 
suming such a protective role on behalf of his patrons, but his concerns 
do point out legitimate differences between the service populations of 
research and teaching institutions that ought to be taken into account in 
collection development. 
Although little, if anything, has been written about this issue vis-5-vis 
school libraries, Pendergrast’s argument might make even more sense in 
this context. It could be argued without much rationalization that such ma- 
terials do not support a school’s curriculum or are not age-appropriate and 
could thus be excluded on the basis of legitimate selection criteria. Of course, 
every school library collection and every student is different, so it is certainly 
conceivable that this would not apply in all cases. Unfortunately, Hupp’s 
research did not include school libraries, so we have no indication of how 
widely these materials may be held in such libraries. 
Perhaps the most difficult dilemmas are faced by public libraries. Do 
they have an obligation to acquire Holocaust denial literature if there a p  
pears to be no demand for it in their communities? As government spon- 
sored institutions, do they have First Amendment responsibilities that re- 
quire them to represent this position in their collections regardless of lack of 
demand? If people use a public library to meet their personal information 
needs, do they have a right to expect that the information they find there will 
be as accurate as librarians can reasonably ensure is possible? 
For most public libraries, answers to the first two questions would be 
negative, to the third affirmative. Hupp’s study found thatjust under 14 
percent of OCLC public libraries own any Holocaust denial materials (p. 
167). Since many public libraries are not OCLC members, the percent- 
age of all public libraries is likely to be much lower. This figure does not 
necessarily, of course, reflect either actual demand, or the judicious ap- 
plication of selection criteria, or the high moral principles of public 
librarians, or even self-censorship. 
Baldwin (in this issue of Library Trends) is right to suppose that the 
interests of the community need to be taken into account when making 
selection decisions. Few would argue that large portions of a limited 
budget should be used to provide materials for which there seems to be 
no demand. But collections are fluid and dynamic things, and librarians 
have a professional responsibility to be not only reactive but proactive in 
their collection-building work. If they order only those materials for which 
there is a known or perceived demand, their collections will stagnate. 
They must remember that just because no one has ever requested a cer- 
tain type of material does not mean no one is interested in it. 
Although Baldwin says government is not obligated to provide citi- 
zens with reading material that espouses a particular viewpoint, he also 
cites legal decisions that require librarians to apply their policies equally 
and in a nondiscriminatory fashion. If this is the case, it follows that 
librarians must make a reasonable attempt to provide access to objection- 
able materials for patrons who request them. This argument does not 
require libraries to actually purchase Holocaust denial materials, but they 
surely must make the same attempts to locate the materials through inter- 
library loan that they would make for less controversial items. While 
librarians must exercise their professional judgment when deciding which 
materials to purchase for their collections, they cannot be in the business 
of approving or rejecting interlibrary loan requests based on content. 
Baldwin does not suggest that librarians should do this, but it is the logi- 
cal result of a stance that absolves them from their responsibility to pro- 
vide access to all viewpoints. 
Perhaps some of the problems associated with these controversial 
materials could be alleviated by the way they are cataloged and classified. 
The current Library of Congress subject headings commonly assigned to 
Holocaust denial materials are “Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945)-Errors, 
inventions, etc.” and “Anti-Semitism.” Some would call this labeling, while 
others would applaud the attempt to distinguish such disreputable schol- 
arship from more credible sources while still maintaining access. The 
Library of Congress Classification scheme assigns works on the Holocaust 
the number D804.3, while works denying the Holocaust are classified 
under D804.35. While this does not completely address the concerns of 
those who feel that an unmistakable distinction must be made between 
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the two, it does serve the purpose of collocating both kinds of materials 
on the shelves while making a nominal distinction between them. 
A major problem with the current subject headings for many is that 
books that refute the claims of the deniers are also assigned the same 
subject headings. Donnelly (1986) suggests that there is a real need to 
distinguish between “scholarly works about ethno-racial prejudice as op-
posed to books thatpromote prejudice [italics added]” (p. 247). One could 
make the argument, however, that linking these materials in some way 
makes it more likely that patrons seeking the works of the deniers will be 
exposed to the refutations. If the subject headings were completely dif- 
ferent from one another, or the books were far apart on library shelves, 
patrons might never even find the more legitimate works unless they were 
specifically seeking them. If the goal of a different cataloging or classifi- 
cation solution is not to mislead users, then separating the two types of 
materials may not be the real answer. 
Abstract philosophical arguments notwithstanding, it does seem to 
many people that the factual accuracy of certain historical facts simply 
cannot be disputed, which renders the entire discussion moot. There are 
thousands of people-fewer each year-with numbers tattooed on their 
arms who were firsthand witnesses to the events denied by the self-styled 
revisionists. There are films and photographs and documents and the 
accounts of the people who liberated the camps. There are the now empty 
camps themselves, with their defunct gas chambers and silent cremato- 
ria. In the face of such evidence, how can any reasonable person claim 
that the Holocaust never happened? And how could any librarian afford 
such a blatant lie the dignity of representation? 
It might be instructive at this point to reflect on the nature of evi- 
dence, and how it is that humans “know” things with which they lack any 
direct experience. No one alive today can claim to have been an eyewit- 
ness to the American Civil War, but the events of that time are generally 
accepted because Americans choose to believe scholars’ interpretations 
of the historical evidence, which include personal accounts that may not 
always be independently verifiable. As one travels further back in time 
and the historical record becomes less complete, points of historical “fact” 
become less universally accepted. People who consider the Bible to be an 
entirely factual historical document need no further evidence that Jesus 
rose from the dead, although not everyone on earth would readily accept 
this as an inarguable point of fact. It would seem that how truthful some- 
thing from the past is depends upon the value that people collectively 
and as individuals place on particular pieces or certain kinds of evidence 
that support the event. 
Then there are matters of scientific evidence. Today the vast major- 
ity of people “know” that the Earth rotates around the sun, yet very few 
have ever directly observed this phenomenon. In fact, if people were to 
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believe only what they saw with their own eyes, they would be compelled 
to state that the sun quite literally moves across the sky while the earth 
stands still. But contemporary society rejects this notion because it places 
a greater value on the theoretical evidence of physics, mathematics, and 
astronomy over what individuals seem actually to observe. Yet because 
some people from some cultures place a higher value on what they see 
with their own eyes, they may believe the sun moves across the sky. Given 
different contexts for different cultures, who “knows” better? 
In the same vein, a majority of Americans “know” that life on Earth 
gradually evolved over billions of years from one-celled organisms swim- 
ming in the primordial soup. Yet not everyone accepts the scientific evi- 
dence that is, for most, overwhelming in its volume. This is less a matter 
of opinion than it is an issue of what kinds of evidence have validity for 
different people. It is not possible to reject the theory of evolution while 
accepting the evidence that supports it. And if anyone personally has 
enough evidence to satisfy himself/herself that something like the theory 
of evolution is true, he or she can hardly demand that others accept the 
proof as sufficient to support other beliefs. Many people think they have 
enough evidence to believe that people are routinely abducted by space 
aliens or that evil spirits exist and can possess unsuspecting children. They 
are free to believe these things and free to try to persuade others of them, 
but they cannot insist that anyone else accept their evidence. Individual 
“facts” may not be subjective, but that which people will accept as evi- 
dence most certainly is. 
The point of this discussion is not to suggest that evidence is utterly 
relative,so librarians should therefore look with tolerance upon the deniers 
as benign proponents of an innocent alternative viewpoint. It does suggest, 
however, that claiming to know the absolute truth about anything is a very 
risky proposition indeed. And once librarians take on the role of Judges of 
Truth, even on such painfully clear-cut issues, there is absolutely no philo- 
sophical barrier to them passing judgment on the truthfulness of all ideas. 
The philosophical arguments for the whole spectrum of library re- 
sponses to the deniers are passionate, thoughtful, and compelling. Any 
of the positions could legitimately be called principled and courageous, 
either for violating the currently held ethical principles of librarianship 
in defense of a greater good, or for risking the wrath of many outside the 
profession in defense of a repugnant idea. Whatever position one wishes 
to take, that position cannot be arrived at without due consideration of 
the implications, both for one’s specific professional situation and for 
the limits of one’s conscience. The correct decision today may well be 
the incorrect one in the future, and it would be hard to accuse those who 
change their minds of waffling on this emotional and agonizing issue. 
Intellectual freedom must include the freedom to believe in a lie. 
Surely librarians do not believe such lies will stand up to scrutiny in the 
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full light of day. Librarians must have faith in the ability of society to 
respond to lies in a forceful and reasoned way, and there can be no re- 
sponse if the lies go untold. Librarians most assuredly have a role in that 
response but not through the suppression of hateful ideas. Although 
Peattie would justify such suppression because of the moral, social, and 
political ramifications of the lie, it is precisely those implications that make 
quashing it so dangerous. Swan (1986) makes this point with eloquence: 
Someone has said that the truth may be simple, but we are complex, 
and therefore our paths to the truth must be complex. Our road 
map is a bewildering maze of smudged and partial truths thoroughly 
enmeshed in falsehoods. To stumble upon a whole truth is a rare 
and lucky event, and we’re usually not equipped to appreciate it. In 
this state of affairs, bad ideas and untruths are a necessary part of 
the search. Like mosquitoes-nasty, sometimes fatal malaria mos- 
quitoes, if you will-they may be utterly detestable, but they are a 
vital ingredient in the overall ecology. To suppress them is to affect 
the ecology of the whole system of discourse. (pp. 50-51) 
The reasoned response to those who deny the Holocaust must come 
from many quarters, and the scholarly community has responded swiftly 
and with vigor. Works by Lucy Dawidowicz (1975, 1992) and Deborah 
Lipstadt (1994) are only a portion of those that have challenged the claims 
of the deniers with sound scholarship. Librarians should respond by re- 
sponsibly and intelligently building collections that provide access to the 
deniers and those who refute them. As Handlin (1987) notes, “a collec- 
tion is evidence of a mind at work, making choices ....The fruit of such 
effort is the collection-not a random agglomeration, but a coherent 
selection” (pp. 213-14). Such coherent and thoughtful selection is the 
professional librarian’s contribution to this modern dilemma. 
Baldwin (in this issue) is correct, of course, in stating that the deci- 
sion to collect the literature of denial is ultimately a local one. The Li-
brary Bill of Rights supports that decision but does not mandate it. How- 
ever, librarians must undertake exclusion of materials with great care, for 
if no one ever buys these materials, no one will have access to them. 
The denial of the Holocaust is not legitimate historical revisionism 
but rather a manifestation of the vile social phenomenon of bigotry. 
Should librarians hide their heads in the sand and pretend that anti- 
Semitism did not or does not exist? To do so would be to fail to acknowl- 
edge its place in contemporary discourse, however repulsed or ashamed 
by it librarians may be. 
Holocaust denial literature should not be suppressed-not because 
the views it represents are of equal stature with others, not because it 
claims to be just another side of the story, but simply because it exists. 
And through the simple fact of its existence, it has much to teach about 
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